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By WILLIAM R. MAPOTHER*
Introduction
Chapter 425 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) de-
lineates provisional remedies, including Kentucky's 1978
amendments to its replevin and attachment laws. These new
prejudgment seizure provisions represent the General Assem-
bly's effort to minimize unnecessary costs and delays, while
also protecting defendants' rights. The results of this at-
tempted reconciliation between a creditor's rights and his
debtor's rights are innovative, serving as a real boon to credi-
tors in an age where there is little else on the legal scene giv-
ing creditors cause to rejoice.1 It is possible that the recent
changes in Kentucky's procedure may prove so successful that
they will be adopted in other states-provided that they are
constitutional.
The statutory changes with which this article is con-
cerned represent a two-pronged approach to provisional reme-
dies: (1) authorization for ex parte writs, and (2) authorization
* Partner in the firm of Mapother and Mapother, Louisville and Lexington,
Kentucky and Jeffersonville, Indiana. J.D. 1963, University of Virginia. The author
wishes to thank his associate, C. Joseph Greene, for his able assistance in the prepa-
ration of this article.
' In August of 1974, Roy L. Steinheimer, Jr., in an address before the West Vir-
ginia Bar Association made the following remark: "Certainty is ideally the morality of
the market place. Summary prejudgment creditors' remedies have had precious little
of this lately." Steinheimer, Address-Summary Prejudgment Creditors' Remedies
and Due Process of Law: Continuing Uncertainty after Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Company, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 79, 95 (1975). William H. Newton is in accord
with Steinheimer's sentiment: "Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
with respect to prejudgment creditors' remedies have interjected substantial confu-
sion into commercial affairs, effectively undermining the entire commercial world."
Newton, Procedural Due Process and Pre-judgment Creditor Remedies: A Proposal
for Reform of the Balancing Test, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 65, 66 (1977). Most credi-
tors and their counsel would agree that the more recent statutes and case decisions
have subtracted little from the truth of these comments.
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for relaxing the hearing requirement when the prejudgment
seizure is not ex parte. As part of the first prong, KRS section
425.308 authorizes an ex parte order of prejudgment attach-
ment on the strength of an affidavit showing "great or irrepa-
rable injury would result to the plaintiff if issuance of the or-
der were delayed until the matter could be heard on notice." 2
Section 425.076 similarly authorizes ex parte writs of posses-
sion.3 The second part of Kentucky's two-pronged approach
to provisional remedies requires the creditor to provide the
debtor with notice that he has seven days in which to petition
the court for a hearing or to pay the claims in full.4 If the
defendant fails to request a hearing after this notice, and the
plaintiff has otherwise satisfied the requirements of chapter
425, either type of writ may be issued without further delay."
Following the United States Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Fuentes v. Shevin e any statute authorizing pre-
judgment seizure of a debtor's property must be drafted care-
fully to survive inevitable challenges to its constitutionality.
Fuentes held that, except for certain extraordinary situations,
due process requires that a debtor be provided with notice
and a hearing before any prejudgment seizure of property in
his possession.7 Such an approach is not appealing to creditors
because it enables the debtor to hide or dispose of the prop-
erty to be seized; but its use increased after Fuentes, as se-
cured creditors searched for means to reach quickly collateral
that app.eared threatened by damage, disposal or deprecia-
tion.8 Due to the continued strength of Fuentes' influence on
2 Ky. RE V. STAT. § 425.308(1) (Supp. 1978)[hereinafter cited as KRS].
' KRS § 425.076(l)(Supp. 1978).
4 KRS § 425.301(3)(Supp. 1978) authorizes this procedure for attachment of
both wages and other types of property. KRS § 425.312(1)(Supp. 1978) prescribes the
same procedure for issuance of a writ of possession. [Editor's note: after this issue
went to press KRS § 425.312 was repealed and reenacted as KRS § 425.012 by 1980
Ky. Acts, ch. 188, § 296 (effective July 15, 1980)].
1 KRS § 425.307(3)(Supp. 1978)(writs of attachment); KRS § 425.312(2)(Supp.
1978)(writs of possession).
6 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
7 Id. at 90_91.
8 This search took another direction as secured creditors increased their resort to
non-judicial repossession because Fuentes did not appear to interfere with a credi-
tor's right to self-help repossession without notice to the debtor. The interpretation
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the imagination of defense counsel in such actions, it is likely
that someone will challenge the constitutionality of one facet
or the other of Kentucky's prejudgment seizure law. The two
issues in such challenges probably will be: (1) whether the
availability of a hearing contingent on a debtor's requesting it,
rather than requiring a mandatory hearing in all cases, is suf-
ficient to satisfy procedural due process; and (2) whether the
current ex parte procedures provide sufficient protection for
the defendant's constitutional rights.
This article will scrutinize Kentucky's new prejudgment
seizure law in light of the constitutional requirements of
Fuentes and its progeny.
I. THE SUPREME COURT, DUE PROCESS, AND PROVISIONAL
REMEDIES
The "modern history"" of the United States Supreme
Court's scrutiny of provisional remedies began in 1969 with
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.10 and extends through the
of Fuentes on this point proved to be correct as at least seven circuit courts of appeal
have ruled that non-judicial repossession does not involve state action and therefore
does not come within the purview of the fourteenth amendment. See Gibson v.
Dixon, 579 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Bosse v. Crowell, Collier & Mac-
Millan, 565 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1977); Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950
(5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Gary v. Darnell, 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974); Turner v.
Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Garver, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365
(5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir.
1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1006 (1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State
Bank of Conn., 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. South Carolina First Nat'l
Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1973); Bilhe Optical Labs,
Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973).
The ironic result is that the Supreme Court's decisions have caused a reduction
in the number of ex parte replevin actions but probably have increased the number of
self-help repossessions. While both procedures are without notice to the debtor, an ex
parte replevin with use of an elected or court-appointed process server seems more
protective of a debtor than the activities of a creditor-selected employee or "outside
adjuster."
1 In an earlier series of cases, the Court approved the use of prejudgment attach-
ment liens which failed to provide for notice or a hearing. See McKay v. McInnes,
279 U.S. 840 (1929); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Ownby v. Morgan,
256 U.S. 94 (1921).
-0 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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1976 decision of Carey v. Sugar.11 Unfortunately the path
from Sniadach to Carey has been anything but straight.
While there have been numerous attempts to reconcile Snia-
dach and its progeny,12 such an effort is beyond the scope of
this article. Instead, this article attempts to distill from these
cases the pivotal factors upon which a decision concerning the
constitutionality of Kentucky's prejudgment seizure law can
be made.
A. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.
Before Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,13 it had long
been assumed by the legal community that the prejudgment
seizure of a debtor's property by a creditor without notice or a
hearing was constitutional. 4 Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority in Sniadach, however, quickly disabused legislators
and creditors of such a notion. In Sniadach, the Court ex-
panded traditional. notions of due process to invalidate Wis-
consin's prejudgment garnishment law, holding that "absent
notice and prior hearing the prejudgment garnishment proce-
dure violates fundamental principles of due process." ' The
Court was careful, however, to limit its holding, noting that
wages constitute "a specialized type of property presenting
distinct problems in our economic system."1 6 In addition, the
Court indicated that there might be extraordinary situations
in which governmental and creditor interests were deserving
of special protection and in which prejudgment seizure of a
1- 425 U.S. 73 (1976) (per curiam).
12 See Brabham, Sniadach Through Di-Chem and Backwards: An Analysis of
Virginia's Attachment and Detinue Statutes, 12 U. RICH. L. Rav. 157 (1977-78)
[hereinafter cited as Brabham]; Catz & Robinson, Due Process and Creditor's Reme-
dies: From Sniadach and Fuentes To Mitchell, North Georgia and Beyond, 28
RuTGa s L. REV. 541 (1974-75) [hereinafter cited as Catz & Robinson]; Kay & Lubin,
Making Sense of the Prejudgment Seizure Cases, 64 Ky. L.J. 705 (1975-76); Rendle-
man, Analyzing the Debtor's Due Process Interest, 17 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 35 (1975-
76); Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of
Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REv. 807 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Scott].
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
14 Brabham, supra note 12, at 157-58.
" 395 U.S. at 342.
16 Id. at 340.
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defendant's property would be constitutional. 17 Such was not
the case, however, with the Wisconsin statute.
While Sniadach left a number of questions unanswered,18
three important points emerged from the decision: (1) a depri-
vation of the use of property, although only temporary, could
constitute a "taking" within the fourteenth amendment;19 (2)
at least in the case of wages, due process requires that the
defendant be afforded notice and a hearing before being de-
prived of their use;20 and (3) there may be cases in which the
state's or creditor's interest is deserving of special
protection. 1
B. Fuentes v. Shevin
Any hope in the creditor community that the Sniadach
requirement might be limited to "specialized types of prop-
erty" such as wages was put to rest three years later in Fuen-
tes v. Shevin. 2 The Court struck down Florida and Penn-
sylvania's ex parte replevin statutes as invalid under the
fourteenth amendment. 23 Both states' statutory schemes au-
thorized the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the ex parte
application of the person seeking the writ.24 Neither statute
provided for notice to the defendant or for a preseizure hear-
25ing. In striking down these statutes, the Court stated that
the requirement that the defendant be given notice and a
hearing prior to deprivation was not limited to "specialized
types of property," as the fourteenth amendment protects all
17 Id. at 339.
Is See Brabham, supra note 12, at 161-62; Catz & Robinson, supra note 12, at
544-45.
" Catz & Robinson, supra note 12, at 545-46; Rendleman, Analyzing the
Debtor's Due Process Interest, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 35, 37 (1975).
20 395 U.S. at 337.
21 Id. at 339. See also Scott, supra note 12, at 818.
22 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
23 Both statutes had been upheld by the lower federal courts. See Epps v.
Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Parham v. Cortese, 407
U.S. 67 (1972); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
24 407 U.S. at 75-76.




The Court also attempted to detail those "extraordinary
circumstances" in which the Sniadach-Fuentes preseizure no-
tice and hearing requirements were inapplicable:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to
secure an important governmental or general public interest.
Second, there has been a special need for very prompt ac-
tion. Third, the State has kept strict control over its monop-
oly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has
been a government official responsible for determining,
under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was
necessary and justified in the particular instance.
27
Justice Stewart continued by exploring the nature of these
categories. Of particular interest to the present inquiry is his
discussion of a situation in which prejudgment seizure might
be constitutional: "[tjhere may be cases in which a creditor
could make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will
destroy or conceal disputed goods."2"
Finally, the Court reaffirmed the Sniadach position on
the type of hearing mandated by due process:
[S]ince the essential reason for the requirement of a prior
hearing is to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of
property, however, it is axiomatic that the hearing must pro-
vide a real test. . . . "[Dlue process is afforded by the kind
of 'notice' and 'hearing' which are aimed at establishing the
validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying
claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived
of this property.
'29
Fuentes' impact on prejudgment seizure laws throughout
the country was enough to make both creditors and legislators
wring their hands and scratch their heads. As similar laws
toppled under Fuentes' authority,30 creditors became pain-
26 Id. at 89-90.
27 Id. at 91.
2S Id. at 93.
29 Id. at 97 (quoting Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969)).
See, e.g., Thompson v. McKeesee, 375 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (per
curiam); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Me.
1973); Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972).
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fully aware of their need for a constitutionally permissible al-
ternative to the convenient, but now illegal, provisional reme-
dies of the past. Whatever problems it presented for creditors
and legislators, Fuentes brought some measure of stability in
the area of provisional remedies,31 since it seemed clear that
except in some extraordinary situations, prejudgment seizure
of a defendant's property without notice and a hearing was
unconstitutional. In addition, Fuentes extended these due
process requirements to all types of property. Two years later,
however, the Supreme Court, with a slightly altered member-
ship, strayed from the clearly marked path of Sniadach and
Fuentes.
C. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.
In 1974, the Supreme Court handed down Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 32 a decision which two commentators unface-
tiously styled a "repossession" of Fuentes.33 In Mitchell, the
Court upheld a Louisiana statute permitting a mortgagee or a
lien holder to obtain a writ of sequestration on ex parte appli-
cation without prior notice to the debtor. The Court charac-
terized the Louisiana procedure as effecting a "constitutional
accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties.""
Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court, refused to overrule
Fuentes, claiming that it "was decided against a factual and
legal background significantly different from that now before
us .... "3 The Court singled out the following factors as dis-
tinguishing the Louisiana statute from those statutes invali-
dated in Fuentes: (1) the mortgagee or lien holder had to sup-
ply an affidavit stating the nature and the amount of the
claim *and the specific facts constituting the grounds relied
upon for issuance of the writ; (2) the requisite showing had to
" Brabham, supra note 12, at 167.
-2 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
"' Newton and Timmons made their response to Mitchell clear both in their text
and in their title: "It [Fuentes] garnered the notoriety which establishes landmark
decisions in law without transcending into the realm of politics or general history.
But its reign, its position, its characterization-its rule?-was shortlived." Newton &
Timmons, Fuentes "Repossessed," 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 469 (1974).
34 416 U.S. at 607.
31 Id. at 615.
1979-1980]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68
be made to a judge rather than a mere court clerk; and (3) the
statute expressly provided for an immediate hearing and dis-
solution of the writ upon the defendant's motion unless the
plaintiff could establish his grounds for issuance of the writ.
The Louisiana statute was drawn narrowly so that the
grounds for issuance of the writ were susceptible to documen-
tary proof.36
11 Id. at 615-18. Thus the Mitchell Court did not expressly overrule Fuentes, but
distinguished the two cases on their facts. A scholarly argument has been made that
Mitchell represents an example of one of the "extraordinary circumstances" listed in
Fuentes in which ex parte prejudgment seizure is permissible. Of course, for such an
argument to prevail, it is first necessary to establish that all three of the conditions
which the Fuentes Court listed as being present in an "extraordinary circumstance"
need not be present in the same case to justify prejudgment seizure without a hear-
ing. For a thorough discussion of this point, and the argument that Mitchell is an
example of one of the "extraordinary circumstances" given in Fuentes and that the
cases can therefore be reconciled, see Kay & Lubin, Making Sense of the Prejudg-
ment Seizure Cases, 64 Ky. L.J. 705, 708-16, (1975-76).
Newton and Timmons contend that Mitchell arguably can be viewed as passing
the entire Fuentes "extraordinary circumstances" test if the protection of property
rights is seen as the important governmental or general public interest, if the
probability of waste or alienation likewise satisfies the requirement of a special need
for very prompt action, and if the participation of a judge fulfills the requirement
that the state exercise strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force. But
Newton and Timmons do not present this analysis as their own, and state that it is
"probably inaccurate" despite Mitchell's failure to overrule Fuentes. Newton & Tim-
mons, Fuentes "Repossessed," 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 469 (1974).
Another commentator, in addressing the question of whether all three conditions
must be present to comprise an "extraordinary circumstance" under Fuentes, has
stated: "If all three things must be present before there is an extraordinary situation
under which the court would approve summary seizure, then the right to this process
would be rare indeed. The better view, however, is that any one of the three will
constitute an extraordinary situation." Brabham, supra note 12, at 166.
Before concluding this discussion of Fuentes' tripartite definition of an "ex-
traordinary situation," it is worth quoting additional commentary:
[T]his suggestion [in Fuentes] that imminent flight, conversion, or seques-
tration of goods might qualify as an 'extraordinary situation' upsets the
three-fold test quoted above. The test seemed to require satisfaction of all
three conditions, but this dictum implies that satisfaction of any one would
be sufficient. That is, if there were a need for prompt action, it would be
irrelevant whether a public interest was at stake.
Catz and Robinson, supra note 12, at 556. This analysis comports with that of Kay
and Lubin.
The "extraordinary circumstance" most recognizable from the Mitchell facts is
the Fuentes Court's third and last example: "[T]he State has kept strict control over
its monopoly of legitimate force: The person initiating the seizure has been a govern-
ment official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn
SURVEY-PREJUDGMENT SEIZURE
Mr. Justice White also emphasized that in Mitchell both
the plaintiff and the defendant had a present interest in the
disputed property and therefore both parties' interests had to
be weighed:
Plainly enough, this is not a case where the property
sequestered by the court is exclusively the property of the
defendant debtor. The question is not whether a debtor's
property may be seized by his creditors, pendente lite, where
they hold no present interest in the property sought to be
seized. The reality is that both seller and buyer had current,
real interests in the property, and the definition of property
rights is a matter of state law. Resolution of the due process
question must take account not only of the interests of the
buyer of the property but those of the seller as well.
37
Obviously the broad command of Fuentes had been
eroded. While the Fuentes Court had required notice and a
hearing before seizure, and made no attempt to distinguish
between secured and unsecured creditors,38 the Mitchell
Court would permit prejudgment seizure in cases in which
statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance." Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
The problem which immediately confronts anyone attempting to explain the
Mitchell result as requiring only one "circumstance" of the three, however, is that the
Mitchell Court never said it was employing the "extraordinary circumstances" ratio-
nale. Another theory which attempts to explain Mitchell as something less than a
complete "repossession" of Fuentes stresses Mitchell's recognition of a current, real
interest of the creditor in the res by way of a vendor's lien. "[Mjitchell recognized a
possible distinction between the provisional remedy of pre-judgment garnishment (or
attachment) and that of statutory repossession based on the repossessing creditor's
significant present interest in the property subject to seizure." Scott, supra note 12,
at 827.
"Fuentes does seem to ignore certain situations where there are two equally valid
interests involved. Yet unless there are current, real interests, Fuentes clearly should
apply. Where there are such current, real interests then a balancing [between the
rights of the creditor and the rights of the debtor] is proper." Newton, Fuentes "Re-
possessed" Reconsidered, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 497, 531 (1976).
This conclusion has had more than one adherent: "If. . .the plaintiff is only a
general or contract creditor or a potential judgment creditor, the interests are not
dual. In such a case, the defendant has the sole interest, and Fuentes controls." Ren-
dleman, Analyzing the Debtor's Due Process Interest, 17 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 35,40
(1975-76).
" 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974).
38 See Brabham, supra note 12, at 164.
1979-1980]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
both parties had an interest in the property and where mini-
mal safeguards were provided. Therefore the status of pre-
judgment seizure procedures was plunged into confusion and
the continuing validity of Fuentes was placed in doubt.3
D. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.
Those legal scholars who viewed Mitchell as less than a
total repossession of Fuentes had their conclusion, if not their
varying analyses, confirmed by yet another surprising deci-
sion, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.40 In Di-
Chem, the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia garnishment
statute which allowed writs of garnishment to be issued in
pending suits by a court clerk on the basis of a plaintiff's affi-
davit containing only conclusory allegations.41 The Georgia
law prescribed the filing of a bond by the debtor as the only
method of dissolving a garnishment once it had issued.42
There was no provision for a hearing either before the seizure
or promptly thereafter.43
The Court explained that the Georgia statute could not
be upheld by virtue of the recent decision in Mitchell because
it lacked the "saving characteristics" of the Louisiana law up-
held there." These saving characteristics, as described by the
Di-Chem Court, were:
[t]he writ... was issuable only by a judge upon the filing of
an affidavit going beyond mere conclusory allegations and
clearly setting out the facts entitling the creditor to seques-
tration. The Louisiana law also expressly entitled the debtor
to an immediate hearing after seizure and to dissolution of
the writ absent proof by the creditor of the grounds on
which the writ was issued.
45
This application of Mitchell to a situation involving an
unsecured creditor further undercut the vitality of Fuentes,
39 Id. at 167.
40 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
41 Id. at 607.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 606.
4 Id. at 607.
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which even after Mitchell was thought to be applicable in
cases involving general creditors.46 After Di-Chem, however,
assuming that the Mitchell safeguards are present, it is clear
that the prejudgment seizure of a defendant's property by a
general creditor is constitutional. In addition, it should be
noted that Mr. Justice White only mentions three of the four
Mitchell safeguards; 47 he does not discuss the need for the
statute to be narrowly drawn so that the decision to issue the
writ can be made on the basis of documentary proof. Mr. Jus-
tice White's omission raised the question of whether the re-
quirement of a narrowly drawn statute was the only Mitchell
safeguard which can be absent or whether the presence of any
three of the four Mitchell requirements is sufficient to uphold
a statute.4
E. Carey v. Sugar
The final case to date in the Sniadach-Fuentes line is Ca-
rey v. Sugar,49 a per curiam decision handed down a year af-
ter Di-Chem. In Carey, the Supreme Court reviewed a three
judge district court's decision5" that the New York attachment
statute was unconstitutional. Although the New York statute
had several provisions in common with the Louisiana statute
upheld in Mitchell,51 the district court had concluded that the
statute was invalid on several counts. First, although the stat-
ute provided for a post-seizure hearing, the court felt such a
hearing was inadequate since, unlike the statute in Mitchell
which required the writ of sequestration be vacated "unless
41 Brabham, supra note 12, at 169-70.
47 S ee text accompanying note 45 supra for Mr. Justice White's listing of the
Mitchell safeguards.
48 See Catz & Robinson, supra note 12, at 63; Schwertz, Constitutional
Law-Due Process-Prejudgment Seizure of Property, 52 DEN. L.J. 619-632 (1975);
Note, Debtors' and Creditors' Due Process: Applying the Balancing Standard, U.
FLA. L. REV. 554, 561 (1977).
49 425 U.S. 73 (1976) (per curiam).
1, Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
5 The district court noted four parallels between the Louisiana statute upheld in
Mitchell and the New York statute in question: (1) the order is subject to judicial
approval; (2) it is issued upon the basis of an affidavit; (3) the creditor must post an
indemnifying bond; and (4) the debtor can regain his property by posting a bond. 383
F. Supp. at 648.
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the plaintiff prove[d] the grounds upon which the writ was
issued,"5 . the New York statute provided that the writ of at-
tachment could be vacated only if the defendant proved that
the attachment was "'unnecessary to the security of the
plaintiff.' 53 Therefore, the district court determined that the
New York statute impermissibly shifted the burden of proof
to the defendant and failed to require inquiry into the validity
of the plaintiff's underlying claim.54 The court also observed
that the New York statute was unconstitutional under Mitch-
ell because the grounds upon which the writ of attachment
could be issued were not "'uncomplicated matters that lend
themselves to documentary proof.' "" Finally, the New York
statute was held constitutionally infirm because it permitted a
creditor without a possessory interest in the property in ques-
tion to obtainla writ of attachment."6
The Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision
and ordered the court to abstain from deciding the constitu-
tionality of the statute until the state courts had interpreted
it.57 In discussing the district court's decision, the Court
stated:
In its [the district court's] view, the hearing available on a
motion to vacate the attachment was inadequate principally
because the hearing would only be concerned with the ques-
tion whether the "attachment is unnecessary to the security
of the plaintiff"..., and would not require the plaintiff to
litigate the question of the likelihood that it would ulti-
mately prevail on the merits. 58
In remanding the case, the Court noted that two New York
trial courts had interpreted the statute to require a post-
seizure hearing on the merits of the plaintiff's case and that a
similar decision by the New York appellate courts would
make it unnecessary for the federal district court to decide the
52 LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1964).
" 383 F. Supp. at 648. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 6223 (McKinney 1963).
383 F. Supp. at 648-49.
Id. at 649.
56 Id.
Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73, 79 (1976) (per curiam).
" Id. at 77.
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constitutionality of the New York statute.5 9 The Court failed
to discuss, however, the effect of the two other deficiencies in
the statute.60 Presumably they are unnecessary to the consti-
tutionality of the statute. Again the Court has raised the
question of what "bare bones" necessities a statute must pos-
sess before it can pass constitutional muster.
F. Summary
Although apparent inconsistencies in this important line
of cases are difficult, if not impossible to reconcile,61 the deci-
sions are not without some guidelines. As a result of these ma-
jor decisions, state legislators and courts should be aware of
the following propositions: (1) the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of due process applies to "any significant taking of
property; '62 (2) ordinarily, the debtor must have notice, and
an opportunity to be heard prior to any prejudgment seizure
of such property; and (3) ex parte prejudgment seizure writs
are constitutional, but only if certain safeguards are provided.
While it would be the height of folly to suggest that Snia-
dach and its progeny can be reduced to a simple list of safe-
guards, such a list can provide a useful tool for determining
the constitutionality of Kentucky's ex parte prejudgment
seizure provisions. Moreover, it should be remembered that it
is unclear as yet how many and what combination of these
factors are necessary to "save" a statute. Nor has the Court
indicated what weight each of these factors is to be given.
With these caveats the following list is proposed:
(1) the decision to issue the writ is made by a judge;
63
"' Id. at 78-79.
6O See notes 55 & 56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the other
two deficiencies.
'1 See, e.g., Newton, Procedural Due Process and Prejudgment Creditor Reme-
dies: A Proposal for Reform of the Balancing Test, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 65, 68-79
(1977); Weisman, Mitchell v. W. T. Grant-Pre-Seizure Hearing-To Be or Not to
Be, 30 Mo. B.J. 474 (1974).
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
'3 See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-07
(1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616 (1974); Guzman v. Western
State Bank, 516 F.2d 125, 130-31 (8th Cir. 1975); Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Berman,
431 F. Supp. 847, 852 (D. Neb. 1977); Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp.
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(2) the plaintiff must post an indemnity bond prior to issu-
ance of the writ;64
(3) the plaintiff must be required to disclose the facts sup-
porting his request for a writ with specificity; 5
(4) an early post-seizure hearing is required by the
statute;66
(5) the writ can be issued only upon narrowly defined
grounds;
67
(6) the defendant can reclaim the property by posting a
bond.68
II. A RECENT HISTORY OF PREJUDGMENT SEIZURE LAW IN
KENTUCKY
In 1974, in Thompson v. Keesee69 a three-judge panel of
643, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Bernhardt v. Commodity Option Co., 528 P.2d 919, 921
(Colo. 1974); Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So.2d 1067, 1070-71 (Fla.
1976); Stoller Fisheries, Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 336, 346 (Iowa
1977); International State Bank v. Garner, 281 N.W.2d 855, 858-59 (Minn. 1979);
Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Utah 1978).
" See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 419 U.S. 601, 612 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring); Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 648
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Bernhardt v. Commodity Option Co., 528 P.2d 919, 921-22 (Colo.
1974); Stoller Fisheries, Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 336, 344-45 (Iowa
1977); International State Bank v. Garner, 281 N.W.2d 855, 859 (Minn. 1979).
65 See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975);
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 615 (1974); Aaron Ferrer & Sons Co. v.
Berman, 431 F. Supp. 847, 852 (D. Neb. 1977); Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F.
Supp. 643, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So.2d
1067, 1070 (Fla. 1976); International State Bank v. Garner, 281 N.W.2d 855, 858-59
(Minn. 1979); Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Utah 1978).
66 See Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73, 77-78 (1976) (per curiam); North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600, 618 (1974); Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125, 131 (8th Cir.
1975); Aaron Ferrer & Sons Co. v. German, 431 F. Supp. 847, 852 (D. Neb. 1977);
Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 648-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Unique
Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So.2d 1067, 1070 (Fla. 1976); Stoller Fisheries,
Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 336, 346 (Iowa 1977); International State
Bank v. Gamer, 281 N.W.2d 855, 859 (Minn. 1979).
617 See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 617 (1974); Sugar v. Curtis Cir-
culation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
68 See Aaron Ferrer & Sons Co. v. Berman, 431 F. Supp. 847, 852 (D. Neb. 1977);
Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 431 F. Supp. 643, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Bernhardt v.
Commodity Option Co., 528 P.2d 919, 922 (Colo. 1974); International State Bank v.
Gamer, 281 N.W.2d 855, 859 (Minn. 1979).
69 375 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Ky. 1974). The weakness in the Kentucky statute was
so similar to the weakness of the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes struck down in
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the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky issued a per curiam opinion declaring Kentucky's
old replevin statute unconstitutional under Fuentes. Ken-
tucky became only one of a number of states whose provi-
sional remedy statutes collapsed under the judicial sledge-
hammer of Fuentes.7 0 After the decision in Thompson, the
1976 Kentucky General Assembly amended Kentucky's pre-
judgment seizure laws to conform to the requirements of
Fuentes.71 The old law was almost totally repealed and re-
placed by new provisions. Unfortunately, in the effort to draft
a statute which would overcome the problems cited in
Thompson, new problems in the amended law escaped the
drafters' notice.
The 1976 changes affected both writs of possession and
writs of attachment. 2 The law governing both writs was
changed to require that prior to issuance of the writ the de-
fendant be served with a copy of the complaint, the motion
and the affidavit in support thereof, and notice of his right to
contest the attachment or replevin at a mandatory hearing. 3
If the defendant could not be found for personal service after
diligent search, an affidavit verifying that a diligent search
was made could be filed, and the defendant could then be
served by certified mail, return receipt requested, to his last
known place of residence. 4
After a mandatory hearing, the "judicial officer" in charge
Fuentes, that this author and others prevailed upon the thirteen circuit judges in
Jefferson County to adopt a local rule prohibiting a clerk from issuing a writ of pos-
session or attachment, and requiring a hearing by the court upon notice to the defen-
dant. This effort to constitutionalize Kentucky's unconstitutional statute was never
subjected to serious challenge.
7' See, e.g., cases cited in note 30 supra.
7 1976 Ky. Acts, ch. 91, § 45.
72 For a more thorough examination of Kentucky's prejudgment seizure law after
the 1976 amendments, see Mapother, Kentucky's New Prejudgment Seizure Law, 40
Ky. BENCH & B. 20 (July, 1976).
73 1976 Ky. Acts, ch. 91, § 4.
74 These requirements are still embodied in KRS § 425.021 (Supp. 1978), which
should have been repealed in 1978. The Senate Judiciary Committee decided not to
repeal it because of the reference to these requirements in KRS § 425.086(2) (Supp.
1978). For further explanation, see Mapother, Prejudgment Seizure-Practice and
Procedure in Kentucky, 42 Ky. BENCH & B. 12, 42 n.5 (Oct. 1978).
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could issue a "writ of possession"75 if the plaintiff established
therein the probable validity of his claim to possession of the
goods, provided he also had supplied the required bond.76 The
sheriff taking possession of the property under the writ was
required to store it for ten days, during which time the defen-
dant could file a bond for redelivery.7 7 Under KRS section
425.066, the plaintiff also was given the remedy of a tempo-
rary restraining order if it appeared probable that the prop-
erty is in immediate danger of being transferred, concealed or
removed, or its value substantially impaired.
The 1976 amendments also provide for ex parte prejudg-
ment writs if the plaintiff can establish to the satisfaction of a
judicial officer that great or irreparable injury will result "if
issuance were delayed until the matter could be heard on no-
tice. 7 8 The judicial officer is to make this determination on
the basis of "facts shown by affidavit. '7 9 In addition, to obtain
an ex parte writ of possession the plaintiff must satisfy the
requirements of KRS section 425.011,80 which requires the
plaintiff to file a written motion, executed under oath in the
court in which the action is instituted. The plaintiff's motion
must include: (1) evidence "of the basis of the plaintiff's claim
and that he is entitled to possession of the property
7' The 1976 amendments borrowed the term "writ of possession" from statutes
in other states. Until that time, the correct term for a writ of replevin was "order of
delivery," and an attachment writ was simply an "order of attachment." The 1976
amendments unfortunately applied to the new term "writ of possession" to both of
these writs.
11 1976 Ky. Acts, ch. 91, § 3.
7 Id. § 20.
78 KRS § 425.076(1) (Supp. 1978) (writ of possession); KRS § 425.308(1) (Supp.
1978) (order of attachment).
Subsection (2) of KRS § 425.308 (Supp. 1978) seems to incorporate all the re-
quirements of KRS § 425.307 (Supp. 1978), when in fact subsection (3) of the latter
statute was not intended to apply to ex parte proceedings because it incorporates the
demand notice procedure of KRS § 425.301(3) (Supp. 1978), a requirement clearly
inconsistent with ex parte proceedings. The legislative history of the statute should
yield a judicial interpretation harmonizing the inconsistencies that developed during
the amending process in the 1978 General Assembly.
7 KRS § 425.076(1) (Supp. 1978) (writ of possession); KRS § 425.308(1) (Supp.
1978) (order of attachment).
8- KRS § 425.076(3) (Supp. 1978). KRS § 425.307(2) (Supp. 1978) imposes some-
what similar requirements for an order of attachment.
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claimed;"'" (2) "a showing that the property is wrongfully de-
tained by the defendant . . . ;,,82 (3) a description of the
property in question and a statement of its value;8 3 (4) a
statement of the location of the property;84 and (5) "[a] state-
ment that the property has not been taken for a tax assess-
ment, or fine. . . or seized under execution against the prop-
erty of the defendant . ... ,, Finally, the plaintiff must
establish the probable validity of his claim to possession of
the property88 and provide the required indemnity bond
before the writ will issue.
8 7
The 1976 legislative revisions left numerous practical
problems which have been considered elsewhere at length, s8
but two major weaknesses in the 1976 revisions deserve some
attention here. First, mandatory hearings held only after per-
sonal service of notice at least ten days prior to the hearing
caused unnecessary delays and expenses, especially in view of
the fact that most defendants never bothered to appear at
these hearings. Second, the general requirement that notice be
served personally, rather than by mail, also was unduly expen-
sive and burdensome.
Under the mandatory hearing provision, the plaintiff's at-
torney was required to obtain a hearing date, list the date in
the notice, and see that the notice and other papers were per-
sonally served on the defendant at least ten days prior to the
scheduled hearing. Sheriffs were often less than dependable,
and if the complaint, motion and notice were served less than
ten days prior to the hearing, the plaintiff's attorney would
have to arrange with the court to cancel the hearing and
schedule a new one. This meant that the complaint, motion
8, KRS § 425.071(2)(a) (Supp. 1978). In addition, if the plaintiff's claim is based
upon a written instrument he must attach a copy of it to the motion. Id.
82 KRS § 425.011(2)(b) (Supp. 1978).
83 KRS § 425.011(2)(c) (Supp. 1978).
84 KRS § 425.011(2)(d) (Supp. 1978).
85 KRS § 425.011(2)(e) (Supp. 1978).
86 KRS § 425.036(1)(a) (Supp. 1978).
87 KRS § 425.111 (Supp. 1978) (writ of possession); KRS § 425.309 (Supp. 1978)
(order of attachment).




and notice, or at least some notice of a new date and time of
the new hearing, would have to be personally served on the
defendant again at least ten days prior to the new hearing. In
the meantime, the defendant mistakenly might come to court
for a hearing that had been cancelled.
In addition, there was increasing evidence that many
debtors failed to take advantage of opportunities for hearings.
In a survey in four cities, Professor Caplovitz discovered that
over ninety percent of the claims in these cities resulted in
default judgments against the debtor. 9 Furthermore, "'nearly
65% of all judgments obtained by banks and more than 47%
obtained by finance companies were entered by default when
the defendant debtor failed to appear.' ,9 As to Kentucky,
the author's own informal survey, which was conducted by his
Louisville office, revealed that over ninety percent of the
debtor-defendants failed to appear at these mandatory
hearings. 1
The requirement that notice be served personally on the
defendant, rather than by mail, was also ill advised and un-
warranted. Service by mail has long been found to afford ade-
quate notice to the defendant of pending litigation.9 2 Ironi-
cally, Kentucky by this time already had an established
procedure for notice by mail in actions for prejudgment at-
tachment of wages.9 The anomalous result was that a wage
earner defendant received a mailed notice at least seven days
before his wages could be attached, but in every other pre-
judgment proceeding, the defendant, whether corporate or in-
dividual, had to be served personally at least ten days prior to
the hearing.
In response to these problems, the 1978 Kentucky Gen-
eral Assembly enacted House Bill 713,94 the principal provi-
sions of which were drafted by this author. House Bill 713
89 2 D. CAPLOVITz, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 11-35, 11-66 (1971), discussed in Scott,
supra note 13, at 817 n.37.
90 Id., discussed in Scott, supra note 12, at 843 n.148.
91 Mapother, Prejudgment Seizure-Practice and Procedure in Kentucky, 42
Ky. BENCH & B. 12, 42 n.6 (October 1978).
912 See, e.g., Ind. Trial Rule 4.1.
91 1970 Ky. Acts, ch. 217, § 5.
9" 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 399.
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eliminated the mandatory hearing procedure, substituting
procedures for a hearing at the debtor's option.95 To obtain a
writ of possession or an order of attachment under the
debtor's option procedure the plaintiff must deliver to the de-
fendant a written demand and a copy of the complaint, mo-
tion and summons, or send these documents by registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the defendant's last
known place of residence, at least seven days before the order
is sought.98 The demand must inform the defendant that he
has seven days in which to petition the court for a hearing or
pay the amount claimed in full, and unless he requests the
hearing or pays the claim within seven days an order will be
sought to attach or replevy his property.97 In addition, the de-
mand must "identify the court in which the suit has been
filed, the grounds therefore, the date of the demand, the
amount of the claim, and the name and address of the plain-
tiff and his attorney."98 If a debtor does not request a hearing
or pay the amount claimed within the seven day period the
writ will issue upon the plaintiff or his attorney filing an affi-
davit evidencing compliance with the demand notice require-
15 House Bill 713 amended KRS § 425.301. 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 399, § 4. It also
created KRS §§ 425.307, 425.308, 425.309, and 425.312. [See editor's note supra note
4 regarding renumbering of KRS § 425.312]. 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 399, §§ 1-3, 5.
96 KRS § 425.312(1) (Supp. 1978) (writs of possession); KRS § 425.301(3) (Supp.
1978) (order of attachment).
The statute purposely was drafted not to require that the mail actually be re-
ceived by the defendant; it was specifically designed to provide a method of service
by mail that is reasonably certain to inform. It is certainly a means that one might
reasonably adopt to furnish notice to a defendant. This method has been upheld as
consititutional in other circumstances. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Since CR 4 requires service by certified mail to be restricted (deliver to addressee
only), one could argue that unrestricted mail service under KRS § 425.301 and KRS §
425.312 is not sufficient to support an in personam judgment. The potential use of
this argument prompted this author to seek an amendment to CR 69 to authorize
unrestricted certified mail service to be sufficient for personal judgment in replevin
and attachment proceedings. CR 69.01 became effective June 1, 1978 and so provides.
See Mapother, Prejudgment Seizure-Practice and Procedure in Kentucky, 42 Ky.
BENCH & B. 12 (October 1978).
97 KRS § 425.312(1) (Supp. 1978) (writ of possession); KRS § 425.301(3) (Supp.
1978) (order of attachment).
98 KRS § 425.312(1) (Supp. 1978) (writ of possession); KRS § 425.301(3) (Supp.
1978) (order of attachment).
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ments.9 9 When the debtor does request a hearing, it will be
held before a judicial officer pursuant to KRS section
425.031.100 No hearing need be held unless requested by the
defendant. The 1978 amendments did not affect the proce-
dure for obtaining an ex parte writ except to make clear that
ex parte orders of attachment are permitted in addition to ex
parte writs of possession.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY OF KENTUCKY'S PREJUDGMENT
SEIZURE LAW
A. Ex Parte Provisions: KRS Sections 425.076 and 425.308
Despite the lamentation of many commentators over an
apparent lack of consistency in the Fuentes line of cases,101
close examination of the cases provides much of the informa-
tion necessary to determine the constitutionality of Ken-
tucky's ex parte prejudgment procedure provisions. 102 Unfor-
tunately, without a crystal ball, it is not possible to predict
with certainty whether Kentucky's present ex parte provisions
can withstand all constitutional attacks. There is, however,
99 KRS § 425.312(1) (Supp. 1978) (writ of possession); KRS § 425.301(3) (Supp.
1978) (order of attachment).
I00 KRS § 425.312(2) (Supp. 1978) (writ of possession); KRS § 425.307(3) (Supp.
1978) (order of attachment).
101 The most authoritative among those commentators criticizing these cases for
inconsistencies have been various members of the Supreme Court itself. Justice Stew-
art, in his dissent to Mitchell, stated: "this case is constitutionally indistinguishable
from Fuentes v. Shevin, and the Court today has simply rejected the reasoning of
that case and adopted instead the analysis of the Fuentes dissent." 416 U.S. 600, 634
(1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). He went on to remark that, "[t]he only perceivable
change that has occurred since the Fuentes case is in the make-up of this Court." 416
U.S. at 635. Thereafter, in a short concurrence to North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), Justice Stewart described the impact of that decision
by paraphrasing Mark Twain: "It is gratifying to note that my report of the demise of
Fuentes v. Shevin . . . seems to have been greatly exaggerated." 419 U.S. at 603
(Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent to Di-Chem, complained: "I accept the views of
... dissenting and concurring Justices in Mitchell that Fuentes at least was severely
limited by Mitchell, and I cannot regard Fuentes as of much influence or precedence
for the present case." Id. at 616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102 See notes 61-68 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the
common factors in the Fuentes line of cases. Also see articles cited in note 12 supra
for attempts to reconcile the decisions.
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good reason to believe that the provisions are sound.
The Court in Fuentes recognized three circumstances in
which ex parte seizure before judgment is permissible.110 Al-
though the language employed by the Court indicates that
these conditions are to be read conjunctively so that all three
must be present to constitute an "extraordinary situation,"
the better view, as urged by commentators, is that any one of
these is sufficient.104 The second condition listed by Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart, that is, "a special need for very prompt ac-
tion," 10 15 is of particular interest. Apparently expanding on
this situation, Mr. Justice Stewart also stated that there may
be a "special need for very prompt action" in those cases in
which "a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger
that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods."106
Under Kentucky's statutory scheme the plaintiff must
make such a showing before an ex parte writ can be issued.
KRS section 425.076(1) requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
that "great or irreparable injury" will result if the writ of pos-
session is not issued until the matter can be heard after no-
tice.110 7 Indeed, KRS section 425.076(2) (a), which provides that
KRS section 425.076(1) is satisfied by a showing of a danger
that the disputed property will be concealed or substantially
impaired in value if the issuance of the writ is delayed until
after a hearing,10 8 appears to be drafted with Mr. Justice
Stewart's words in mind.
The present status of the "extraordinary situation" ex-
ception nevertheless is unclear, especially in light of the
Court's failure to apply it in Mitchell.10 9 It is therefore neces-
sary to evaluate Kentucky's prejudgment seizure statute in
terms of the factors developed by the courts after Mitchell.
One such factor is that the ex parte writ is issuable only
103 See text accompanying note 27 supra for the Court's explication of these
situations.
10 Brabham, supra note 12, at 166 & n.39.
105 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
10' Id. at 93.
107 KRS § 425.076(1) (Supp. 1978).
108 KRS § 425.076(2)(a) (Supp. 1978).
IcO Catz & Robinson, supra note 12, at 558.
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by a judge.110 Under Chapter 425, ex parte writs of posses-
sion"' and attachment,1 2 as well as those which follow a
debtor-requested hearing,"83 can be issued only by a judicial
officer. The term "judicial officer" as defined in KRS section
425.006(1) means "any judge or any commissioner or other of-
ficer appointed by the trial court to perform the duties re-
quired by this Chapter. 1" 4 It is clear from section 425.076
(writs of possession) and section 425.308 (writs of attachment)
that in issuing these writs the judicial officer is performing a
judicial function which is not at all akin to a nondiscretionary,
automatic issuance by a court clerk.
Chapter 425 likewise requires the plaintiff to post a bond
of at least twice the amount of the property before the writ of
possession" 5 will issue and a bond of at least twice the
amount of the claim before a writ of attachment"' will issue.
In addition, the defendant may reclaim possession of the
property or prevent the plaintiff from taking possession pur-
suant to a writ of possession by posting a similar bond.
17
Such provisions seem in line with those singled out by Mr.
Justice Powell in Di-Chem"8 and by later courts'" as provid-
ing necessary safeguards. Moreover, under the ex parte provi-
sions the judicial officer's decision to issue an ex parte writ
must be made on the basis of "facts shown by affidavit.'
20
Thus the statute apparently requires more than the con-
clusory allegations permitted under the statutes invalidated in
Fuentes and Di-Chem.
Kentucky's ex parte statutory scheme lacks an express
provision for a prompt post-seizure hearing at which the cred-
110 See, e.g., cases cited in note 63 supra.
-- KRS § 425.076(1) (Supp. 1978).
--- KRS § 425.308(1) (Supp. 1978).
n KRS § 425.031 (Supp. 1978).
1 KRS § 425.006(1) (Supp. 1978).
n KRS § 425.111 (Supp. 1978).
KRS § 425.309 (Supp. 1978).
11 KRS § 425.116 (Supp. 1978).
118 419 U.S. 601, 612 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
119 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 64 & 68 supra for discussion of various safe-
guard provisions.
120 KRS § 425.076(1) (Supp. 1978) (writ of possession); KRS § 425.308(1) (Supp.
1978) (order of attachment) (emphasis added).
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itor-plaintiff must establish the grounds upon which the writ
was issued. The presence or absence of such a provision was
relied on in part by the Mitchell 21 and Di-CheM1n 22 Courts in
assessing the constitutionality of the statutes in question. In-
deed, Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Di-Chem
went so far as to elevate the requirement of a prompt post-
seizure hearing to a constitutional necessity.123 Such a conclu-
sion is not indicated by the majority opinions in Mitchell and
Di-Chem, however. 124 In each case the Court did not reach its
decision on the statute in question solely on the basis of
whether it provided for a prompt post-seizure hearing.
Rather, the Court scrutinized the statutes in light of a number
of factors. In Mitchell, for example, Mr. Justice White also
pointed to the requirements that the plaintiff's affidavit set
forth detailed facts demonstrating that the creditor was enti-
tled to the writ 125 and" that the whole process be overseen by a
judicial officer1 26 as "saving characteristics" of the statute.
The present Kentucky statute contains both of these
elements. 27
Furthermore, Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority
in Mitchell and Di-Chem, never attempted to rate any of the
safeguards as to their relative importance. In fact, it is far
from settled that all of the Mitchell safeguards must be pre-
sent before a statute will be upheld.1 28 The Court's failure in
Di-Chem and Carey to examine the Georgia and New York
121 416 U.S. at 618.
122 419 U.S. at 607. See also case cited in note 66 supra for assessment of safe-
guard provisions by other courts.
121 Id. at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring).
"' See Newton, Procedural Due Process and Prejudgment Creditor Remedies:
A Proposal for Reform of the Balancing Test, 34 WASH. & LEE L. RE V. 65, 73 (1977);
Note, Debtors' and Creditors' Due Process: Applying the Balancing Standard, 29 U.
FLA. L. REV. 554, 561 (1977); Comment, Prejudgment Seizure of Property, 52 DEN.
L.J. 619, 632 (1975).
120 416 U.S. 600, 615 (1974).
1'6 Id. at 616.
127 KRS § 425.076(1) (Supp. 1978) (writ of possession) and KRS § 425.308(1)
(Supp. 1978) (order of attachment) require the writs to be issued on the basis of
factual affidavits. Judicial supervision also is required by KRS § 425.076(1) (Supp.
1978) (writ of possession) and KRS § 425.308(1) (Supp. 1978) (order of attachment).
126 Catz & Robinson, supra note 13, at 563; Note, Debtors' and Creditors' Due
Process: Applying the Balancing Standard, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 554, 561 (1977).
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statutes in light of all four of the Mitchell requirements sup-
ports the theory that a statute may be upheld even though
lacking a particular Mitchell safeguard. Indeed, such a theory
is implicit in Carey where the Court seemed willing to uphold
a statute which lacked several of the Mitchell safeguards. 2 "
As noted before, 50 the Court in Carey suggested that the New
York statute, which lacked a number of the Mitchell safe-
guards, might be constitutional if the New York courts inter-
preted it to require a post-seizure hearing on the merits of the
plaintiff's claims.'"' Such a reading of Carey is compatible
with the one suggested here: a statute which lacks an express
provision for a prompt post-seizure hearing but which con-
tains other safeguards not found in the New York statute may
provide sufficient due process protection to pass constitutional
requirements. 13 2 Thus, in view of the safeguards which the
Kentucky statute does provide, the omission of an express
post-seizure hearing should not render the statute predictably
unconstitutional.
B. Hearing-at-Debtor's Option
Before examining Kentucky's hearing-at-debtor's option
procedure it should be noted that the Court in Fuentes was
not imposing upon the states a single, inflexible procedure.
Rather, as the Court observed, "[1]eeway remains to develop a
form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary costs and de-
lay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hear-
ing in preventing seizures of goods where the party seeking
the writ has little probability of succeeding on the merits of
the dispute. 11 33 The hearing-at-debtor's option procedure ac-
complishes just that.
Moreover, the Court in Fuentes was not mandating that a
12 See notes 49-60 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Carey.
130 See text accompanying note 59 supra for further discussion of this point.
131 425 U.S. 73, 78 (1976) (per curiam).
1s2 Professor Scott has argued convincingly that requiring an immediate post-
seizure hearing is not the most effective or efficient method for protecting the
debtor's rights. Scott, supra note 12, at 855-58. In its stead he would substitute re-
quirements for a prompt final adjudication and creditor-debtor bonds. Id. at 858-60.
122 407 U.S. 67, 97 n.33 (1972).
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hearing be held automatically in each case. The Court could
have construed Sniadach to require such a hearing,1" but
clearly it rejected such an interpretation:
[W]e deal here only with the right to an opportunity to be
heard. Since the issues and facts decisive of rights in repos-
session suits may very often be quite simple, there is a likeli-
hood that many defendants would forego their opportunity,
sensing the futility of the exercise in the particular case.
And, of course, no hearing need be held unless the defen-
dant, having received notice of his opportunity, takes advan-
tage of it.135
The Court's concern was that the debtor be provided with no-
tice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the seizure of
the disputed property. The optional hearing procedure pro-
vides both notice and an opportunity for a hearing, while
avoiding unnecessary expense and delay. 36
13" Scott, supra note 12, at 818.
,3B 407 U.S. at n.29 (emphasis in original). Similar language in another Supreme
Court case is worth comparing to the above quote from Fuentes:
Due process does not, of course, require that the defendant in every
civil case actually have a hearing on the merits. A State, can, for example,
enter a default judgment against a defendant who, after adequate notice,
fails to make a timely appearance .... or who, without justifiable excuse,
violates a procedural rule requiring the production of evidence necessary for
orderly adjudication. . . . What the constitution does require is "an oppor-
tunity ... granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner. .... "
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971) (citations omitted).
13 It is interesting to note that the new Bankruptcy Code, in section 102(1),
construes "notice and hearing" in a manner parallel to the construction placed on
this constitutional requirement by Kentucky's new prejudgment seizure law.
In this title-
(1) "after notice and a hearing" or a similar phrase-
(A) means after such notice as is appropriate in the particular circum-
stances, and such opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in the particu-
lar circumstances; but
(B) authorizes an act without an actual hearing if such notice is given
properly and if-
(i) such a hearing is not requested timely by a party in interest;
or
(ii) there is insufficient time for a hearing to be commenced
before such act must be done, and the court authorizes such act
11 U.S.C.A. § 102(1) (Special Pamphlet 1979).
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In a similar situation, the Court has indicated its willing-
ness to accept an optional hearing procedure under appropri-
ate circumstances. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v.
Craft137 was a suit challenging the constitutionality of a mu-
nicipal utility's procedure for terminating electric, gas, and
water services. When the utility's records showed that a bill
was overdue for a sufficient length of time, it sent a final no-
tice "simply [stating] that payment was overdue and service
would be discontinued if payment was not made by a certain
date.' 13 8 The notice did not inform the customer of any proce-
dure for challenging a disputed bill. 39 The Court held that
the utility's failure to provide their customers notice of the
available procedures for challenging disputed bills and "an
opportunity to present their complaint to a designated em-
ployee empowered to review disputed bills and rectify errors"
was a deprivation of property without due process of law.140 In
a footnote, Mr. Justice Powell clarified that the Court was not
requiring mandatory hearings in every case:
[L]ay customers of electric service, the uninterrupted con-
tinuity of which is essential to health and safety, should be
informed clearly of the availability of an opportunity to pre-
sent their complaint. In essence, the recipients of a cut-off
notice should be told where, during which hours of the day,
and before whom the disputed bills may appropriately be
considered. 41
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Stevens agreed with this reading of
the case: "I do not understand the Court to require municipal
utilities to schedule a hearing before each termination notice
is mailed. The Court seems to assume, as I do, that no hearing
of any kind is necessary unless the customer has reason to be-
lieve he has been overcharged."'
42
It seems clear, therefore, that there are no constitutional
objections to a procedure under which a hearing is held only
1.7 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
1"8 Id. at 13.
'39 Id. at 13-14.
140 Id. at 22.
14 Id. at 14 n.15.
412 Id. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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at the debtor's option. What remains to be examined is
whether the specific provisions of Kentucky's optional hearing
procedure truly provide the debtor with notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. In this regard, it should be noted that
Mitchell and the cases following it are not directly applicable
here since the Fuentes requirement of notice and an opportu-
nity for a hearing prior to the seizure is satisfied. There is
therefore no need to inquire into what safeguards are neces-
sary in lieu of such notice and opportunity for a hearing.
143
One provision which may raise some concern is that
under KRS section 425.312 (writ of possession) and KRS sec-
tion 425.301(3) (orders of attachment) the debtor may be
given only seven days in which to pay the claim in full or peti-
tion the court for a hearing. Such a short length of time, it
might be argued, fails to provide the debtor with real notice or
opportunity for a hearing. This seems especially true in light
of the provisions in the Kentucky1 44 and Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure1 45 allowing a party twenty days to respond to
a prior pleading. Such an argument misconstrues what is re-
quired of the debtor during this period. The debtor must only
decide between paying the claim in full and petitioning the
court for a hearing. There is no need to draft a responsive
pleading. Moreover, such an argument fails to take into ac-
count the very nature of prejudgment seizure, which is a pro-
visional remedy. If the creditor had to wait twenty days from
the service of his complaint in the demand letter before he
could repossess his collateral, he would be in no better posi-
tion than if there were no prejudgment seizure statute. That
is, he would be entitled to a default judgment and could have
postjudgment execution against the debtor. The very purpose
of prejudgment seizure is to allow the creditor to repossess
and protect his collateral in the interim between filing suit
and obtaining judgment.
143 For example, if the debtor does not exercise his option and request a hearing
after the creditor has given him an opportunity to be heard, then it would no longer
be necessary for a "judicial officer" to issue the writ. At that point, the issuance of the
writ becomes merely a clerical function and may be issued by a clerk.
Il Ky. R. Civ. P. 12.01.




Fuentes and its progeny did not prevent practical pre-
judgment seizure remedies which protect the due process
rights of debtors. Kentucky's new prejudgment seizure law
may well provide a guide for other state legislatures. A short
inspection of statutes in some other states reveal that recent
amendments have not resulted in workable procedures yet.
The California legislature's response to Fuentes and its prog-
eny, for example, is similar to Kentucky's original undesirable
procedure-that of requiring a notice hearing before issuance
of a writ of possession.146 Florida's post-Fuentes replevin stat-
ute1 7 at least provides that a hearing need not be held if it is
waived by the defendant-an unlikely occurrence in view of
the high percentage of defaulting defendants in such cases.148
Nebraska goes so far as to require that any voluntary waiver
by the defendant of his right to a hearing must be under
oath. 1 49 The legislators of North Carolina appear particularly
naive in their solution to the requirements of Fuentes: upon
the plaintiff's request, the clerk sends the defendant a form
for written waiver of the hearing. If this form is not returned
signed by the defendant, a hearing must be held.160
Clearly, these sample attempts to overcome the practical
difficulties imposed by Fuentes' requirements of prior notice
and hearing fall far short of Kentucky's new procedure. The
simple innovation of providing the defendant in a prejudg-
ment attachment or replevin proceeding with adequate notice
and an optional hearing upon the debtor's request provides
due process, with less delay and less expense. Kentucky's pro-
visions for ex parte prejudgment seizures also reflect an
awareness of constitutional guidelines for such procedures. Its
omission of an express provision for a prompt post-seizure
hearing does not seem enough to render the provisions uncon-
stitutional in view of the other due process safeguards they
' CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 512.020 (West 1979).
147 FLA. STAT. § 78.065 (Supp. 1979).
148 2 D. CAPLOVITz, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 11-35, 11-66 (1971), discussed in Scott,
supra note 12, at 843 n.148.
149 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1093.02 (1975).
180 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-474.1(b) (Supp. 1979).
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contain. Of course, the General Assembly could remove any
doubt as to the constitutionality of these ex parte procedures
by simply adding the requirement of such a post-seizure, pre-
judgment hearing to the existing safeguards. Local courts also
could adopt rules requiring that hearings always promptly fol-
low any ex parte seizure within their jurisdiction. The effect of
that type of additional safeguard is probably only cumulative,
and should not be viewed as strictly necessary to the present
statute's preservation, at least not according to the guidance
thus far granted by the Supreme Court in the matter.

